THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT AND ZONING:
A STUDY IN UNCERTAINTY
RICHm-ID F. BABCOCK*

UNICIPAL zoning is the backbone of urban planning and like
most vertebrae it suffers from being taken for granted. The
promotion of efficient urban housing and transit may be
frustrated or ultimately wrecked by a carelessly drawn and indifferently
administered zoning map. The availability of private capital or public
funds for the eradication of the blight that infects large segments of our
urban areas may be jeopardized because a sloppy municipal zoning program threatens the orderly resurrection of our disordered communities.
Unfortunately, however, zoning contains neither the romance of the
park and highway program nor the political and social drama of the slum
clearance project. Since its early da)s (when it came dangerously near to
becoming a fad) zoning has been-to the city dweller-either a completely
forgotten thing or an irritating nuisance suddenly thrust in the path of
his plans to develop his property in accordance with his own wishes,, Yet
it seems idle to plan seriously the more dramatic aspects of municipal development in the face of a mediocre or bad zoning record. This is especially
true with respect to the part the courts will be asked to take in approving
future plans for urban rehabilitation. The police powers may be malleable,
but once a court has cast a jaundiced eye upon one phase of municipal
planning it becomes more difficult to convince the justices of the good
faith behind related programs.
I
On the record the Supreme Court of Illinois has not been sympathetic
to municipal zoning as it has been practiced in Illinois. During the twentysix years that the state enabling act has been law,2 the Court, in eighteen
out of twenty-nine cases, has held that a particular zoning ordinance as it
was applied to a particular piece of property was unreasonable and, hence,
* Member of the Illinois Bar.
' Zoning suffers not only from the arrows of irritated laymen but also from the barbs of the
more zealous planners. For the thesis that zoning can never be an effective implement in urban
rehabilitation because the courts would not sustain zoning laws which were strong enough to
accomplish major objectives in planning see Tugwell, The Real Estate Dilemma, 2 Pub. Admin.
Rev. 27-40 (1945).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) C. 24 § 73.
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invalid.3 In five of the eleven cases in which the ordinance was sustained
the action taken by the city or village (and challenged by property owners) was to reclassify property from a more restricted to a less restricted
use. 4 Since it is generally admitted by critics and administrators alike that
one of the greatest evils of Illinois zoning has been the overestimate in the
zoning maps of the amount of property needed for commercial purposes,s
and since, as a practical matter, the primary function of zoning has been
to protect residential property from industrial and commercial encroachments,6 it is arguable that the record is even more lopsided than the figures
suggest.7 At least it may be said that any municipality which defends its
3 Ordinance held invalid: 2700 Irving Park Building Corp. v. Chicago, 395 Ill. 138, 69 N.E.
2d827 (1946); Anderman v. Chicago, 379 Ill. 236, 4o N.E. 2d 51 (1942); LaGrange v. Leitch,
377 Ill. 99, 35 N.E. 2d 346 (1941); Harmon v. Peoria, 373 Ill. 594, 27 N.E. 2d 525 (1940);
Taylor v. Glencoe, 372 Ill. 507, 25 N.E. 2d 62 (ig39); Catholic Bishop v. Kingery, 371 Ill.
257, 2o N.E. 2d 583 (i939); Johnson v. Villa Park, 370 Ill. 272, 18 N.E. 2d 887 (1938); People
ex rel. Kirby v. Rockford, 363 Ill. 311, 2 N.E. 2d 842 (z934); Reschke v. Winnetka, 363 Ill.
478, 2 N.E. 2d 718 (1936); Ehrlich v. Wilmette, 361 Ill. 213, 197 N.E. 567 (1935); State Bank &
Trust Co. v. Wilmette, 358 fll. 311, 193 N.E. 131 (i934); Merrill v. Wheaton, 356 Ill. 457,
19o N.E. 918 (1934); People ex rel Lind v. Rockford, 354 Ill. 377, x88 N.E. 446 (1933); Tews v.
Woolhiser, 352 Ill. 212, 185 N.E. 827 (1933); Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166, i8o N.E. 767
(1932); Kennedy v. Evanston, 348 Ill. 426, 181 N.E. 312 (1932); Michigan-Lake Building
Corp. v. Hamilton, 340 Ill. 284, 172 N.E. 710 (1930); People ex rel. Deitenbeck v. Oak Park,
331 Ill. 4o6, 163 N.E. 445 (1928). Ordinance held valid: De Bartolo v. Oak Park, 396 Ill. 404,
71 N.E. 2d 693 (1947); People ex rel. Miller v. Gill, 389 Ill. 394, 59 N.E. 2d 67i (i945); Burkholder v. Sterling, 381 Ill. 564, 46 N.E. 2d 45 (1943); Zadworny v. Chicago, 380 Ill. 470, 44
N.E. 2d 426 (1942); Avery v. LaGrange, 381 Ill. 432, 45 N.E. 2d 647 (1942); Neef v. Springfield, 380 Ill. 275, 43 N.E. 2d 947 (1942); Morgan v. Chicago, 370 Ill. 347, 18 N.E. 2d 872
(x938); Evanston Best & Co. v. Goodman, 369 Ill. 207, 16 N.E. 2d 131 (1938); Rothschild v.
Hussey, 364 Ill. 557, 5 N.E. 2d 92 (1936); Minkus v. Pond, 326 Ill. 467, 158 N.E. 121 (1927);
Western Springs v. Bernhagen, 326 Ill. 1oo, 156 N.E. 753 (1927).
4 People ex rel. Miller v. Gill, 389 Ill. 394, 59 N.E. 2d 671 (i945) (property rezoned from
single-family to apartment use); Burkholder v. Sterling, 381 Ill. 564,46 N.E. 2d 45 (x945) (from
residential to commercial use); Zadwomy v. Chicago, 380 fl1. 47o, 44 N.E. 2d 426 (1942) (from
apartment to commercial use); Avery v. LaGrange, 381 Ill. 432, 45 N.E. 2d 647 (1942) (from
single-family to multiple-family use); Morgan v. Chicago, 370 Ill. 347, i8 N.E. 2d 872 (1938)
(from residential to commercial use).
Zoning ordinances generally divide -the community into five or more use districts. The
basic divisions (which in many communities are further refined) are: single family residential,
two-family or apartment house, commercial, and industrial. Oak Park, Ill., Zoning Ord. (1937)
§ 35.930-35.933. In some municipalities there are as many as nine use districts. Chicago
Mun. Code (Hodes, 1939) §§ 194A-4.
- Amortization of Property Uses Not Conforming to Zoning Regulations, 9 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 477 (1942); Address of Hugh Young, Chief Engineer, Chicago Planning Com'n, before
Nat'l Society of Civil Engineers, New York City (Jan. 21, 1937); Bartholomew, The Zoning of
Illinois Municipalities, 17 Il1. Mun. Rev. 221 (1938).
6 There has been "a shift of emphasis as to the purpose of zoning, from one of effectuating
the planned development of a community to one of attempting to protect property values by
preventing harmful intrusions into residential neighborhoods and of seeking to lend an area
of special value to areas zoned for commercial and industrial use." Walker, The Planning
Function in Urban Government 23 (194i).
It is not suggested that changed conditions in the municipality or improper zoning in the
first place may not justify the reclassification of property to a less restricted use. It does
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zoning ordinance before the Illinois Supreme Court must assume the
heavy burden of demonstrating that its regulations differ from the great
majority of the zoning ordinances which the Court has scrutinized.
This record of antipathy should be of considerable importance to many
people. It must affect the actions of municipal planning authorities who
draw up the ordinances.8 The decisions of administrative agencies, such
as local boards of zoning appeal 9 and of the municipal councils, 0 will inevitably be tempered by the knowledge that the highest court in the state
has, more frequently than not, frowned upon their efforts. The apparent
view of the Court is of some concern to the judges of the Circuit and Superior Courts who bear the initial judicial brunt of the legal attacks upon
this phase of urban planning.
Today, this poor record is especially disturbing for two reasons. First,
the end of the war has prompted many Illinois communities completely
to rewrite their ordinances -and reshape their zoning maps. This has been
done with great effort and, in many instances, at considerable expense
and under the direction of highly skilled professional urban planners."
The resident in his capacity as taxpayer has a considerable investment in
the ordinance. The second reason why this problem may cause nervousness, at least among municipal officials and zoning experts, lies in a recent
appear significant, however, that in five of the six cases where the city has sought to lower the
use restrictions on a particular piece of land over the protest of neighboring property owners
the Supreme Court of Illinois has sustained the municipality while in those cases where the
municipality has sought to defend a more restricted classification the Court has, in eighteen
out of twenty-three cases, held against the city. Kennedy v. Evanston, 348 Ill. 426, 181 N.E.
312 (x932), is the only case where the Court held that an amendment lowering the use classification was illegal.
8Note 65 infra.
N 9 ote 66 infra.
1o In recent years the more common practice has been to place greater responsibility for the
administration of the zoning ordinance in the city council and to restrict the power of the local
board of appeals to grant variations to the zoning map. Chicago Mun. Code (Hodes, 1939)
§ 19 4 A-22. This shift has been partly due to an uncertainty as to the legal authority of boards
of appeal. Cf. Welton v. Hamilton, 3 44ll. 82, 176 N.E. 333 (ig3i). A major reason for placing
more authority in the city council has been the belief on the part of planning experts that
boards of appeal had been too generous in granting use variations. Thus, it was believed that
if a change in the use regulation could be obtained only by an amendment passed by the city
council the zoning map would not be subject to so many indiscriminate changes. In theory, at
least, an amendment should be for the benefit of the entire community; a variation, however,
is granted where a property owner shows "particular hardship." Amortization of Property
Uses Not Conforming to Zoning Regulations, 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 477, 495 n. 99 (X942).
-Highland Park Zoning Ordinance (Draft, June, 1946) prepared by Bartholomew & Associates, St. Louis, Missouri. The Zoning Commission of Oak Park, Ill., is presently considering a
comprehensive urban plan drafted by the same organization. In the past three years Morton
Grove and Lincolnwood, Illinois completely revised their municipal zoning ordinances. Chicago
revised its zoning map in 1942. In a related field see Preliminary Report of Planning Survey,
Clarendon Hills, Illinois, McFudzean, Everly, Rose & Associates (Jan. 1947).
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amendment to the Illinois Zoning Act. In 1943 the legislature passed an
amendment to the Act by the terms of which municipalities may provide
for the gradual eliminationof uses which do not conform to the regulations
of the district in which they are located.1" In effect, such an ordinance
would mean that a municipality could, after a reasonable period of years,
order the owner of a grocery store or a beauty parlor which was located in
an area zoned for residential use to cease using the property for anything
but residential purposes. 3 And this without compensation.14 This law, and
any ordinance enacted thereunder, will face ticklish constitutional questions which unquestionably will eventually be debated before the United
States Supreme Court.' The attitude of the Illinois Supreme Court as
illustrated by the record in zoning cases does not make for sanguine hopes
as to the fate of this new provision.
It is suggested then that the history of the judicial attitude toward
zoning in Illinois calls for some analysis. In an earlier article the flaws of
- "The powers conferred by this article shall not be exercised so as to deprive the owners
of any existing property of its use or maintenance for the purpose to which it is then lawfully
devoted, but provisions may be made for the gradual elimination of uses, buildings and structures which are incompatible with the character of the districts in which they are made or
located, including, without being limited thereto, provisions (a) for the elimination of such
uses of unimproved lands or lot areas when the existing rights of the persons in possession
thereof are terminated or when the uses to which they are devoted axe discontinued; (b) for
the elimination of uses to which such buildings and structures are devoted, if they are adaptable
for permitted uses; and (c) for the elimination of such buildings and structures when they are
destroyed or damaged in major part, or when they have reached the age fixed by the corporate
authorities of the municipality as the normal useful life of such buildings or structures." Ill.
Rev. Stat. (1945) C. 24 § 73-1. The large majority of Illinois ordinances now provide that
existing non-conforming uses may continue except where partially destroyed, or where "discontinued for a certain period of time." Cf. Douglas v. Melrose Park, 389 Ill. 98, 58 N.E. 2d
864 (1945). All ordinances restrict additions to non-conforming uses. This provision has been
held valid. Mercer Lumber Co. v. Glencoe, 39o Ill.
138, 6o N.E. 2d 913 (x945).
'3 The Chicago ordinance provides that all non-conforming uses shall be discontinued
"upon transfer of ownership or termination of the existing lease, as the case may be, of the
person in possession as owner or lessee of the property devoted to such non-conforming use on
the effective date of this ordinance, unless then maintained in a building designed for such
non-conforming use ..... " In such event the ordinance provides for an "amortization" period of from fifty to one hundred years depending upon the type of construction of the building.
Chicago Mun. Code (Hodes, 1939), § 194 A-2o. Provisions for gradual elimination of the nonconforming use have been incorporated into the zoning ordinances of Lincolnwood and Morton
Grove, Illinois. See also Highland Park Proposed Zoning Ord., Bartholomew & Associates
(June, 3946), art. XIV.
X4The use of the power of eminent domain for this purpose has never been seriously advocated. Walker, op. cit. supra note 4 at 99; cf. State ex rel Twin City Bldg. &Investment Co. v.
Hougliton, I44 Minn. 1, 174 N.W. 885 (1919).
Is For a discussion of the constitutional and practical problems raised by such a provision
see Amortization of Property Uses Not Conforming to Zoning Regulations, 9 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 477, 482-86 (1942); Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 Col. L. Rev. 457 (i941);
Fratcher, Constitutional Law-Zoning Ordinances Prohibiting Repair of Existing Structures,
35, Mich. L. Rev. 642 (3942): Retroactive Zoning Ordinances, 39 Yale L. J.735, 737 (1930).
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zoning as it has been practiced in Illinois were set out in detail.' 6 There is
abundant evidence that zoning has not always been a carefully planned
program designed for the benefit of the entire community. The examples
of gross overzoning for commercial uses, the indiscriminate granting of
use variations and the careless "spot" amendment to the zoning map have
been recorded. 7 It is only a half truth, nevertheless, to say that zoning has
been cursed by politics. The boards of appeal who frequently have authority to grant variations in the use to which property is put are generally
made up of citizens who are property owners themselves (or real estate
agents) 8 and they are not eager to be too harsh on their neighbors who
may become irked by the zoning restrictions.
Bluntly, the record of Illinois zoning is not one that would inspire any
court to place great faith in its preventive, and, much less, its curative
powers over the serious ills with which urban land development is afflicted.'9

II

Granted, then, that responsibility for the indifferent to bad record cannot be passed off to an arbitrary judicial attitude. Nevertheless, it could
be hoped that the Court would take the opportunity to clearly (and, perhaps, with understandable irritation) state what it believed to be the
measure of valid municipal zoning.20
6Amortization of Property Uses Not Conforming to Zoning Regulations, 9 Univ. Chi.L.
Rev. 477, 489-96 (1942).
7Ibid.
X8"The disproportionate number of realtors is due primarily to their avowed special interest

in zoning and consequent pressure for representation from local realty boards." Walker, op.
cit. supra note 6, at isi.
,9In further explanation of zoning's poor record in the courts, the briefs and records pre-

sented by attorneys in many of these cases reveal a failure to sustain the burden of proving the
value of zoning to the healthy growth of the community. Municipalities have frequently resorted to arguing with complainants over the relative value of land if zoned for commercial
rather than residential use, a hopeless debate in which the municipalities have usually come
out the loser. See Abstract of Record, Harmon v. Peoria, 373 Ill.
594, 27 N.E. 2d 525 (1940);
Abstract of Record, People ex rel. Kirby v. Rockford, 363 Ill. 531, 2 N.E. 2d 842 (x936).

In a few cases cities have called in authorities on municipal planning to assist with the record.
Evanston Best & Co. v..Goodman, 369 Ill. 207, i6 N.E. 2d 131 (1938); Reschke v. Winnetka,
363 l1. 478, 2 N.E. 2d 728 (r936). The failure to make use of non-legal materials recalls the
practice of attorneys vainly defending state minimum wage laws prior to Louis Brandeis'
successful use of economic and social statistics in his briefs in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(igo8). Mason, Brandeis, A Free Man's Life 252 (1946).
20The unsatisfactory record is partly due to some very weak cases which have been permitted to reach the Court. The friction developed by intracommunal quarrels has prompted
stubbornness where, to the observer acquainted only with the record and not with the multitude of extra-legal facts and local prejudices, compromise seemed in order. 2700 Irving Park
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What legal standards, if any, has the Supreme Court of Illinois established? If zoning is to mend its ways may it look to the decisions for guidance? Are there certain facts which, reappearing in "sympathetic" decisions and being absent in opinions in which ordinances have been invalidated, give a clue to valid urban planning? Or, if the sequence of facts is
ambiguous and confused, has the Court worked out certain principles
which may serve as monuments?
Parenthetically, it should be noted that it is difficult to find any clear
pattern in the type of zoning case which the Court has passed upon. In
eight cases the property owner wanted to erect a gas station in an area
zoned residential. 21 In five, a homeowner wished to convert his one-family
residence to a two- or multiple-family dwelling. 22In three cases the quarrel
was over the right to build apartments in areas originally zoned for singlefamily residential use.2 3 Eight cases involved small commercial encroachments into residential areas ;24 in only one was a sizable manufacturing
establishment involved.' A school 6 and a trailer27 were in dispute in the
remaining cases. The only conclusion at this point is the expected: there
has been nothing dramatic in the contest between property owners and
Building Corp. v. Chicago, 395 III. i38, 69 N.E. 2d 827 (1946); Catholic Bishop of Chicago v.
Kingery, 371 Ill. 257, 2o N.E. 2d 583 (1939). Once removed from their immediate community
context these cases become merely precedents which threaten more reasonable efforts to protect the zoning ordinance.
21Neef v. Springfield, 380 Ill. 275, 43 N.E. 2d 947 (1942); Morgan v. Chicago, 370 Ill. 347,
x8 N.E. 2d 872 (1938); Rothschild v. Hussey, 364 Ill. 557, 5 N.E. 2d 92 (1936); State Bank &
Trust Co. v. Wilmette, 358 Ill. 311, 193 N.E. x31 (1934); People ex rel. Lind v. Rockford,
354 Ill. 377, 188 N.E. 446 (i933); Tews v. Woolhiser, 352 Ill. 212, i85 N.E. 827 (1933);
People ex rel. Deitenbeck v. Oak Park, 331 Ill. 406, 63 N.E. 445 (1928); Western Springs v.
Bernhagen, 326 Ill. 1oo, 156 N.E. 753 (1927).
22 DeBartolo v. Oak Park, 396 Ill. 404, 71 N.E. 2d 693 (1947); Avery v. LaGrange, 381 Ill.
432,45 N.E. 2d 647 (1942); Anderman v. Chicago, 379 Ill. 236,40 N.E. 2d 51 (1942); Harmon
v. Peoria, 373 Ill. 594, 27 N.E. d 525 (1940); Merrill v. Wheaton, 356 l. 457, 19o N.E. 918

(1934).

23People ex rel. Miller v. Gill, 389 Ill. 394, 59 N.E. 2d 671 (1945); Kennedy v. Evanston,
348 Ill. 426, 181 N.E. 312 (1932); -Mvinkusv. Pond, 326 i1. 467, i58 N.E. 121 (1927).

24Burkholder v. Sterling, 381 Ill. 564, 46 N.E. 2d 45 (1943) (type of commercial use not
specified); Zadworny v. Chicago, 380 Ill. 470, 44 N.E. 2d 426 (1942) (motion picture theatre);
Taylor v. Glencoe, 372 Ill 507, 25 N.E. 2d 62 (1939) (unspecified commercial use); Johnson v.
Villa Park, 370 Ill. 272, 18 N.E. 2d 887 (1938) (undertaking parlor); Evanston Best & Co. v.
Goodman, 369 Ill. 207, x6 N.E. Ad 131 (1938) (retail dry goods store); Reschke v. Winnetka,
363 Ill. 478, 2 N.E. 2d 718 (I936) (storage of building materials); Ehrlich v. Wilmette, 361 Ill.
213, 197 N.E. 567 (i935) (unspecified); Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 66, 18o N.E. 767 (Y932)
(two-story brick building).
Irving Park Building Corp. v. Chicago, 395 Ill. 138, 69 N.E. 2d 827 (1946).
371 Ill. 257, 20 N.E. 2d 583 (1939).

25

2700

26

Catholic Bishop v. 3,ingery,

2"LaGrange v. Leitch, 377 Ill. 99, 35 N.E. 2d 346 (194r).
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municipalities since the early days when zoning's constitutionality was
being challenged2 8 The private interests have been those of the "average

citizen" who is annoyed over what he believes to be a silly restriction
upon his inalienable rights. No industrial goliath has moved into the legal
arena to challenge zoning. This has, of course, made the battle a little
more difficult for zoning's proponents.
If the source of the cases turns up little in the way of a clue, the search
for a pattern of facts is equally discouraging. A few examples of fact situations common to nearly all zoning cases will illustrate the uncertainty.
The ordinance caused a considerable loss in the value of the property in
question.
The most consistent weapon that has been employed in suits challenging the validity of zoning ordinances has been the contention that by zoning land for residential use it affects a loss of property value to the owner
who envisions his land as the site of a commercial enterprise. This charge
has been used with considerable effect in a number of cases. In People
ex rel.Lind v. City of Rockford,29 a permit to build a gas station was denied
by the city because the property was zoned for residential purposes. In
ruling that the ordinance as applied to this property had no relation to the
"public health, safety, welfare, and morals" and thus was unconstitutional,
the Court said:
There is ample evidence in the record to justify a finding that the lots involved in
this litigation are worth as little as $6oo each for residence purposes .... while on the
other hand, the evidence would justify a finding that for business purposes the lots
would be worth as much as $8,ooo each.30
In State Bank and Trust Co. v. Wilmette3r the Court, in holding an ordinance invalid in conformity with the protest of a property owner who
wished to erect a gas station in a residential area, observed that "to enforce the zoning ordinance would depreciate the property in question from
$200 per front foot to $5o.''32 Indeed, in almost every case in which an
ordinance has been held invalid the Court has stressed the loss in property
33
value.
28The United States Supreme Court upheld zoning against attack on constitutional
grounds in Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
29

354 Ill.
377, x88 N.E. 446 (1933).

30Ibid., at 379 and 447. Cf. People ex rel. Kirby v. Rockford, 363 Ill. 31, 2 N.E. 2d 842
(1934).
31358 Ill. 31i, 193 N.E. 131 (1934).
32Tbid., at 325 and 136.
3 See, for example, Taylor v. Glencoe, 372 II. 507, 512, 25 N.E. 2d 62, 65 (i939) (three
times more valuable for commercial than residential use); Reschke v. Winnetka, 363 Ill. 478,
2 N.E. 2d 718 (1936) (worth $3o for residential, $125 for commercial use).
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Since it is apparent that "expert" estimates as to decline in "value -are
possible in almost every case where the use of property is restricted, the
above cases suggest that the position of the municipality is hopeless. As a
matter of fact, the situation, while not hopeless, is confused. In Evanston
Best & Co., Inc. v. Goodman 34 petitioner asked the city of Evanston for a
permit to construct a retail store in an area zoned for apartment use. The
property was located on the edge of the principal business district and on
a heavily traveled thoroughfare. The Court sustained the action of the
city and held the ordinance as applied to petitioner's property to be a valid
exercise of the police power. The Court said:
Petitioner emphasizes the fact that its property would be far more valuable if zoned
for commercial purposes, but this fact exists in every case where the intensity with
which property may be used is restricted by zoning laws.n
In the more recent case of Neef v. Springfield36 the Court accepted evidence that certain property was worth $3,500 for commercial use and only
$1,200 for residential purposes. The ordinance, however, was held
valid. In so far as the "loss-in-value" argument was concerned the Court
stated what would appear to be applicable in many cases:
.... to permit appellants' lots to gain in value it is necessary for the entire neighborhood to lose and the city to suffer by the resulting loss in taxable value. The prevention
of such a loss by the city is one of the specific purposes for which the zoning power is
granted, and it is directly related to the public welfare. On this ground alone we think
the ordinance should be sustained.37

The property in dispute is near land which is devoted to non-conforming
uses or is on the periphery of the more restricteduse district.
One of the most troublesome problems which faces the planners and administrators of zoning ordinances is where to draw the boundary lines of
use districts. The haphazard growth of our cities and villages has resulted
in an interlarding of strips of residential areas with stores, gas stations,
and even heavy industrial properties. To superimpose a use map upon an
established urban area must inevitably result in creating large numbers of
non-conforming uses and, in many cases, in establishing dividing lines between use districts which will offend those who own property on or near
the border line. In many of the cases property owners who contest the

ordinance underscore the apparent disparity between their restricted
rights and the freedom of their neighbors who either operate a non-conforming use or are in a neighboring area zoned for a less restricted use.
34 369

111

207,

3Ibid., at

211

16 N.E. 2d
and 133.

131

(1938).

36 380

11.

275, 43

N.E.

2d 947 (,942).

7 Ibid., at 280-81 and 950.
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The resolution of this problem would seem to rest primarily with the
municipal planners and administrators. This was the opinion of the Court
in the Neef case. There the owner of property located on a through boulevard wanted to erect a gas station. The area was zoned exclusively for residential purposes. The evidence tended to establish that the land in the immediate area was devoted to mixed residential and commercial uses. Private homes appeared in dose proximity to a souvenir shop, a grocery store,
and a lunch stand. The local board of appeals recommended to the city
council that the property be rezoned to permit the construction of a gas
station. This the council refused to do. The petitioner then sought to enjoin the city from enforcing the ordinance. Although the master in
chancery recommended that the writ issue, the chancellor dismissed the
bill. In sustaining the decision of the lower court the Court laid down the
following rule:
Appellants' contention that it is unreasonable to allow their neighbors' property a
commercial classification, and deny the same classification of their property cannot be
sustained. This argument would lead to the conclusion that the next adjoining lot in
the north would then, by the same logic, become entitled to commercial classification,
and so on until the entire neighborhood was reclassified and commercialized ..... The
problem of whether ....[appellants' lot] is to be characterizedby the residentialareaadjoiningit on the north andfacingit on the west and south or by the commercial area adjoining it ow the east is certainlydebatable and one to be answered by the city council and not by
this court so long as the city acts within its powers.38
This was not a new doctrine. In 1932 the Court had recognized that
"the very nature of the zoning ordinance requires that certain desirable neighborhoods adjoin others less desirable."' 39 In 1935, however, a
property owner sought an injunction against the enforcement of the
zoning ordinance by the village of Wilmette. 40 His property which was
zoned residential was on the edge of a small neighborhood shopping district. A suburban electric railway terminus was nearby. Apartments and
one-family residences adjoined his property on two sides. Beyond the
small shopping district the area was almost exclusively devoted to residential use. This time the master reported in favor of the village but the
chancellor issued the injunction. The Court sustained the chancellor with
these words:
Here appellee's property is not characterized by the residence area lying west and
south, but rather by the business district to the north and the commercial and industrial property across the street and by the use of the street as a business street. 4'
38 Ibid., at 282-83 and 95i (italics added).
39Kennedy v. Evanston, 348 111.426, 433, i8i N.E. 312, 314 (1932).
4o Ehrlich v. Wilmette, 361 ill. 213, 197 N.E. 567 (x935).
4' Ibid., at 225 and 572.
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In an earlier case the Court had invalidated a zoning ordinance with this
comment:
There being another gasoline filling station and other service stations and garages
located and in operation within the same area as appellant's property, little could be
said in support of the ordinance as being for the benefit of the public health, morals,
safety or welfare.
One should not assume that the Neef case hasupset the yiews expressed
in these earlier cases. Remarks similar to those quoted are still to be found
43
in the later cases.
The owner purchasedthe property after the ordinancewas in existence and
thus had at least constructive notice of the restrictionupon the use of his land.
It has been the belief of some municipal officials that successful attacks
upon zoning ordinances would diminish as property changed hands and an
increasing number of grantees took title to property after it had been
zoned. It was hoped that by application of a rule of constructive notice
the purchasers of land the use of which was restricted would be estopped
from challenging the validity of the ordinance. That there was some legal
foundation for this theory was suggested, by the Court in the Evanston
Best & Co. case:
Petitioner was well aware of the restriction upon the use of the property in this district when it purchased the lot in question and the evidence it has produced in this
case raises questions which, at most, are debatable.44
In 1936 the Court observed in Rothschild v. Hussey,45 that the petitioner
had purchased the property after the ordinance was passed:
At the time this suit was begun [the ordinance] ....

had been in force for nearly

ten years and real estate was purchased and many improvements made in reliance upon
its restricted classifications.46
Nine years earlier the Court had dismissed a bill for injunctive relief
against a city, stating: '
Appellant bought his property after the zoning commission had been appointed and
after most of the territory had been surveyed.47
41 People

ex rel. Deitenbeck v. Oak Park, 331 Ill. 406, 412, x63 N.E. 445, 447-48 (1928).
"In ascertaining whether the application of the zoning ordinance to plaintiffs' property
transcends constitutional guarantees the character of the property in the immediate neighborhood, in contradistinction to the character of [the district] as awhole, requires consideration."
Harmon v. Peoria, 373 Ill. 594, 6oi, 27 N.E. 2d 525, 528 (1940).
4,369 Ill. 207, 211-12, 16 N.E. 2d 131, 133 (1938).
4'364 li. 557, 5 N.E. 2d 92 (1936).
46Ibid., at 560 and 93.
4 Western Springs v. Bernhagen, 326 Ill. oo, o3, x56 N.E. 753, 754 (1927).
3
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Yet in 1932 the Court, in Forbesv. Hubbard,48 in reply to the defense that

the property had been purchased after the ordinance had been passed,
stated flatly:
We know of no rule of law that creates an estoppel against attack by such purchaser
on the validity of a zoning ordinance.49

In 194o this statement was cited with approval in Harmon v. City of
Peoria.SO
Closely related to the above problems is the question, in cases where a
property owner seeks to have his property reclassified from residential to
commercial, whether it is a significant fact that there already is in the
urban area large tracts of land available for commercial development.
Again, the answer apparently is sometimes yes and sometimes no.s '

II
If the Court has failed to indicate clearly what facts are significant in

determining the validity or invalidity of a zoning regulation, the statements of principle which appear in the cases are no more edifying. s2 One
can find only general propositions satisfactory to city or property owner,
depending upon which cases are cited. Thus, in those cases where the
Court has sustained the ordinance, one invariably finds a statement closely approximating the following:
The power of a city or village to adopt comprehensive zoning laws is based upon the
police power, and their prohibitive restrictions are valid if they bear a reasonablerela-

lion to the public comfort, morals, safety and general welfare ..... We have repeatedly
held that these relativefactors are determinative regardlessthat here and there some individval may suffer an invasion of his property.s3
48 348 Ill. 166, i8o N.E. 767 (1932).
49Ibid., at 175 and 771.
50373 Ill. 594, 602, 27 N.E. 2d 525, 529 (1940).

s' Compare Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 fll. 166, i81-82, 18o N.E. 767, 773 (932) with Kennedy

v. Evanston, 348 Ill. 426, 433, 18i N.E. 312, 314 (1932).
s, There is one point on which there appears to be no room for debate: the Illinois Supreme

Court does not believe that an ordinance which excludes two-family dwellings from residential

areas in which boarding houses, golf courses, schools and farms are permitted is a reasonable
exercise of the police power. Anderman v. Chicago, 379 Il. 236,40 N.E. 2d 51 (1942); Harmon
v. Peoria, 373 Ill. 594, 27 N.E. 2d 525 (r94o); Merrill v. Wheaton, 356 Ill. 457, 19o N.E.
918 (i934). But cf. DeBartolo v. Oak Park, 396 Ill. 404, 71 N.E. 2d 693 (i947).
Since many Illinois zoning ordinances permit such uses in areas where two-family residences
are forbidden, the serious problem of protecting single-family areas from invasion by two-family
dwellings will not be easily solved.
S3Rothschild v. Hussey, 364 Ill. 557, 559, 5 N.E. 2d 92, 93 (1936) (italics added).
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In the more frequent cases where the ordinance has been invalidated the
following frequently repeated rule neutralizes if it does not impliedly contradict the above:
If a restrictive ordinance bears no real and substantialrelation to the preservation of
the public health, safety or welfare, but is, in fact, a capriciousinvasion of property
rights, then such an ordinance becomes invalid and cannot be sustained.S4

The most serious issue, however, on which it would be hoped that a
clear rule would be established is the scope of the Court's review of each
zoning case and the extent to which each ordinance will be given the benefit of any doubt. The following statement made in Morgan v. Chicagoss
would appear to represent a sound willingness to give considerable freedom to the discretion of the administrative or legislative body responsible
for the ordinance:
It is primarily the province of the municipal body to which the zoning function is
committed, to draw the line of demarcation as to the use and purpose to which property shall be assigned or placed, and it is neither the province nor the duty of courts to
interfere with the discretion with which such bodies are vested, in the absence of a
clear showing of an abuse of that discretion ..... Whether the action of the city council in passing the variation ordinance was an unreasonable, arbitrary or unequal exercise
of power may be fairly debatable. Yet in such instances we have established the rule
that this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body charged
with the primary duty and responsibility of determining the question.... s5
Has the Court established such a rule? In Reschke v. Village of Winnetka,S7 the Court held an ordinance invalid because it prevented the use

of a lot for commercial purposes. Zoning experts Harland Bartholomew
and Jacob L. Crane testified for the village. On the other side, real estate
experts said that the property was worth $125 a foot for commercial purposes but only $3o a foot for residential use. Though located on a through
highway and close to some small business enterprises, the tract also adjoined residential property. Before reaching its decision the Court reiterated that "if the restrictions [imposed by the ordinance] are considered
either doubtful or fairly debatable, courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the legislative body of the particular municipality."1
S4Taylor v. Glencoe, 372 Ill.
507, 510-11, 25 N.E. 2d 62, 65 (ig39) (italics added).
s 370 Ill.
347, i8N.E. 2d 872 (I938).
s6 Ibid., at 35o and 873. "Itmust be emphasized at the outset that this court is not a zoning
commission. All questions concerning the wisdom or desirability of particular restrictions in a
zoning ordinance must be addressed to the legislative bodies specifically created to determine
them." Evanston Best & Co. v. Goodman, 369 Il.207, 209, 16 N.E. 2d 131, 132 (1938).
S 363 Ill. 478, 2 N.E. 2d 718 (1936).
'5 Ibid., at 485 and

721.
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The reasonableness of this ordinance would seem to have been, at the very
least, debatable. The local zoning board of appeals and the city council
had refused to change the ordinance; in this opinion they had been sustained by the master and the lower court. The Court, nevertheless, concluded that the ordinance was unreasonable beyond all debate and thus
invalid.
In 1934 the Court held invalid an ordinance of Wheaton, Illinois, which
restrained a property owner from remodeling his single-family residence
into a two-family dwelling5 9 In this case the administrative agency, the
city council, and the chancellor had found the ordinance a reasonable exercise of the police power.
When, in i94o, the Court again held that the unreasonableness of a
zoning ordinance was not debatable, although the city council, the master
in chancery and the chancellor had thought it reasonable,0 Justice Wilson, dissenting, was constrained to observe:
Although this court has recently proclaimed that it is not a zoning commission and
that all questions with respect to the wisdom or desirability of particular zoning restrictions must be addressed to the legislative bodies specifically created to determine
them ....it is manifest that the decision in the case at bar is a departure from this
sound and salutary rule.6X

Justice Wilson could, indeed, have quoted the words of the Court in
Morgan v. City of Chicago:
....a decision of this case depends primarily on the facts, and these have been passed
upon by five different agencies created for that purpose: First by the board of appeals;
second, by the subcommittee of the city council; third, by the city council itself;
fourth, by the master in chancery; and fifth, by the chancellor."
The only possible conclusion is that, although the Court early spelled
out the orthodox rule of statutory construction that "the presumption is

in favor of the validity of a zoning or other ordinance adopted pursuant
to a legislative grant,"'3 the result of the cases appears to require the
municipality to show "affirmatively and clearly" its reasonableness.
The legal status of zoning in Illinois is in complete confusion and this despite the fact that its constitutionality was recognized twenty-two years
ago. No professional city planner can confidently advise a municipality
whether any portion of the zoning map will stand up under legal attack.
s9Merrill v. Wheaton, 356 Ill. 457, 19o N.E. 918 (1934).
60Taylor v. Glencoe, 372 Ill.
507, 25 N.E. 2d 62 (1939).
6 Ibid., at 513 and 67.
62370 I1. 347, 350-51, 18 N.E. 2d 872, 873 (1938).
6'Rothschild v. Hussey, 364 Il.557, 559, 5 N.E. 2d 92, 93 (1936).
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No city attorney can prepare his case with the confidence that the facts
are favorable or that the rules set down by the Court in earlier cases point
in a favorable direction. Equally important, in many instances it is difficult for an attorney or city planner to counsel the municipality that a
particular issue is better compromised than contested.
It should be again emphasized that the blame for this confusion should
not be placed on the Court. The inconsistency and lack of sympathy displayed by the cases is attributable in great part to the complete inadequacy of zoning as it has, by and large, been practiced in this state. There
is some evidence, however, that progress is being made in the direction
64
of improving the administration of this phase of urban planning.
IV
At this time it may thus be worthwhile to suggest a few standards which
might be used to measure the validity of zoning ordinances in order that
the hoped-for improvement in zoning practice may be met by a fresh
judicial approach.
Far greater significance should be given to the procedural due process
which the complaining property owner has obtained. This should be of
particular importance in those cases where the ordinance has been sustained by agencies further down the judicial ladder. If it can be clearly
demonstrated i) that the original zoning map was established only after
adequate hearings s and 2) that the complainant has been given a complete
64 In i94o Evanston, Illinois restored large areas to residential use. In x942 Chicago revised
its zoning map adding large areas to residential use and cutting down some of the property
zoned but not used for commercial use. See also note ii supra. It is too early, however, to
state that there has been any permanent improvement in the day-to-day administration of
zoning ordinances.
6sSection 2 of the state enabling act provides for the creation of a zoning commission by the
t"corporate authorities in each municipality which desires to exercise the powers conferred by
this article ...... After the preparation of a tentative report and a proposed zoning ordinance
the commission is required to hold a hearing and "shall afford persons interested an opportunity to be heard." Notice of the hearing must be given by publication at least fifteen days in
advance of the meeting "in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality." The notice
must state the time and place of the meeting and the place where copies of the proposed
ordinance will be available for inspection. The commission must report to the "corporate authorities" and submit to them a copy of the proposed ordinance within thirty days following
the hearings. The authorities may enact the ordinance "with or without change or may refer
it back to the commission for further consideration."
Under this section one series of public hearings is mandatory and two are possible before the
ordinance is enacted. Ill. Rev. Stat. (I945) c. 24 § 73-2. On one or two occasions the court has
taken notice of the importance of these preliminary hearings. State Bank and Trust Co. v.
Wilmette, 358 Ill. 311, 318, x93 N.E. 131, 133 (1934); Western Springs v. Bernhagen, 326 Ill.
oo, 1o3, 156 N.E. 753, 754 (x927).
By providing that the zoning commission "shall cease to exist upon the adoption of the
zoning ordinance" Section 2 may anticipate practical necessities in smaller communities but it
also mirrors the general initial enthusiasm followed by public and official indifference which
frequently is the history of zoning ordinances.
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hearing on his request for an amendment or a variation to the zoning map
before the city council or the board of appeals, then the municipality's
case should be recognized as strong." It is extremely difficult for a court of
last resort to do an adequate job of analyzing the substantive merits of a
city-wide zoning ordinance as it applies to one piece of land. A good ordinance can only be drawn with a view to the future needs as well as the
present condition of the municipality; 67 a good ordinance must consider
each piece of property as an integral part of the entire community, not as
an isolated bit of land. Yet when a case comes before the Supreme Court
it is almost impossible to view the issues in this perspective. What the
Court sees is a small plot of land, independent of the rest of the urban area
and unrelated to any future development. Only the Court, however, can
fairly determine whether the objector has received a fair airing of his
complaint. If the municipality can establish this-and in not a few instances there has been serious doubt that a fair or adequate hearing has
been given 68-then the circumstances should be extreme to justify a reversal of the opinion of the legislative or administrative body.69

The phrase "extreme circumstances" suggests the second factor which
should be considered by the Court: the presence of political or neighborhood pressures which have distorted the purpose of the ordinance. There
are examples in the cases. The refusal to permit a parochial school to be
built in an area where public schools are permitted,7 ° and the granting of
an amendment for the purpose of allowing a sixty-story building to be
66 Under Section 3 of the Act the city council or board of trustees may provide for the
appointment of a board of appeals consisting of five members serving staggered terms of five
years each. The board is charged with hearing appeals from any administrative officer responsible for enforcing the ordinance. The concurring vote of four members of the board is
required to reverse the order of such administrative officer or to decide "in favor of the applicant any matter upon which it is required to pass under such an ordinance or to effect any
variation in the ordinance, or to recommend any variation Dr modification in the ordinance of
the corporate authorities." Under Section 4 of the Act the ordinance may provide that either
the board of appeals or the city council may grant variances to the regulations. No variation
may be granted except after a public hearing before the board of appeals of which there must
be a fifteen-day published notice. Every change whether in the form of a variation by the board
of appeals or by ordinance after a hearing before the board must be accompanied by "a finding
of fact specifying the reason for making the variation."
Section 5of the act establishes the procedure for an appeal by a complainant from the order
of an administrative officer to the board.
67See Mercer Lumber Co. v. Glencoe, 390 Ill.
138, 145, 6o N.E. 2d 9r3, 917 (1945).
68 See report on field study of records of hearings before zoning boards of appeals in a number of Illinois municipalities, Amortization of Property Uses Not Conforming to Zoning Regulations, 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 477, 492-94 (1942).
69The Supreme Court does not consider the board of appeals to be more than a "minor
administrative body" whose report is "entitled to no more weight than the conclusions of a
witness resting upon facts not in evidence." Behnke v. President and Bd. of Trustees of Brookfield, 366 Ill.
516, 5ig, 9 N.E. 2d 232, 233 (1937).
7oCatholic Bishop v. Kingery, 37x Ill. 257, 20 N.E. 2d 583 (1939).
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erected in an area limited to thirty-story structures and the repeal of this
amendment immediately after the permit had been granted ' are examples. The Court, however, has stated in a recent zoning case that the motives behind legislative action will not be inquired into.Y In other words,
political or neighborhood pressures behind action of a city council would
not influence the decision as to the merits of a particular ordinance. But
evidence of this in the record would appear to be a fair basis for attack
upon the ordinance. 73 Indeed, the Court has taken oblique notice of politicking with a zoning ordinance in the recent case of 2700 Irving Park
Building Corporationv. City of Chicago.7 4 In 1942 the city of Chicago rezoned certain properties from industrial to apartment use. The Court
made the following comments on the motives behind the amendment:
The witness Ross [a former alderman] testified that his purpose in promoting the
1942 amendment, rezoning the west 125 feet of the 53-acre tract to apartment use, was

a temporary restriction of the use of the whole tract with the idea that eventually the
.entire tract would be used for park purposes or, in his own words, "to build a wall
around there knowing that they could not build on the inside and it would be too
damned expensive and I wanted a park there." Witness Gurman, who succeeded Ross,
as alderman, expressed the same purpose; the extent to which he was willing to go in
keeping factories out of the tract is indicated by the fact that he commenced a suit
late in 1942 to temporarily prevent the plaintiff, among others, from making an industrial or manufacturing use of the property. This suit was discontinued as soon as the
1943 amendment was passed.
The Court then drew the fine line between motives of the city council and
motives of those who "promoted" the amendments:
As already observed it would be improper for this court to consider the motives of
the city council in enacting the ordinances of 1942 and 1943. It is, however, pertinent
to observe that those promoting those amendments were motivated by a desire to
prevent the use of the property for manufacturing purposes until such time as their
dream of a playground or a park could become a reality. Those interested in this movement included one of the city's expert witnesses, Dobroth. These parties were not con71Michigan-Lake Building Corp. v. Hamilton, 340 Ill. 284, 172 N.E. 710 (1930).
2 "The courts cannot inquire into the factors or reasons which motivated the council in
passing the ordinances." 2700 Irving Park Building Corp. v. Chicago, 395 Ill. 138, 147, 69

N.E. 2d 827, 831 (x946).
73 Evidence of political or neighborhood pressures would tend to indicate that the action
taken did not conform to the stated purposes of the Act:
"To the end that adequate light, pure air, and safety from fire and other dangers may be
secured, that the taxable value of land and buildings throughout the municipality may be
conserved, that congestion in the public streets may be lessened or avoided, and that the public
health, safety, comfort, morals and welfare may otherwise be promoted, the corporate authorities in each municipality have the following powers ...... " Ill. Rev. Stat. (x945) C.24

§ 73-1.
74.395

Ill. 138, 69 N.E. 2d 827 (1946).
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cerned with having the 53-acre tract devoted to its highest and best private use; rather
their desire was to keep it from being used at all until such time as it could be converted into a playground or a park. These facts are proper to be considered in weighing
the testimony.7s

The need for greater emphasis upon the procedural aspects and upon the
absence of political or neighborhood pressures is suggested not merely by

an appreciation of the proper function of the courts in zoning. If the Court
were to stress these factors one might expect some improvement in the dayto-day administration of the ordinance. Candid judicial criticism of improper or careless administration might make it apparent that it is an extravagant waste of taxpayer's money to draw up a careful urban plan and
then permit it to degenerate by careless administration. The decisions of
the Court with their emphasis upon land values and non-conforming uses
tend to divert attention away from the serious flaws in zoning: indifferent
or incompetent administration of what may originally have been a carefully planned ordinance.
Thirdly, it is suggested that the Court should lead the way in discounting the exaggerated emphasis which has been placed upon the relative
value of a piece of land for commercial or residential uses, The Illinois
statute does require that zoning ordinances give consideration to existing
land values.7 This should mean, however, land values throughout the entire urban area. As the Court has observed, to permit the use of one piece
of land for commercial purposes may well mean the loss in value of other
land in the neighborhood and, eventually, in the entire community. 7 Furthermore, it seems apparent that any restriction upon the use of most
land is going to affect its marketability and thus tend to diminish its
value. This result is inherent in zoning. Twenty years ago the Supreme
Court of the United States held that such a loss was no constitutional objection to zoning78 That opinion, together with the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court in Aurora v. Burns79 should have removed the question
7sIbid., at i5o-5i and 833.
76"In all ordinances passed under the authority of this article, due allowances shall be

made for existing conditions, the conservation of property values, the direction of building
development to the best advantage of the entire municipality and the uses to which the property is devoted at the time of the enactment of such an ordinance." Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945), c. 24
§ 73-I.
27'Neef v. Springfield, 38o Ill. 275, 280, 43 X.E. 2d 947, 950 (1942). But see Taylor v.
Glencoe, 372 Ill. 507, 512, 25 N.E. 2d 62, 65 (1939).
78 In the famous Euclid case the record showed that the realty company's land was worth
about $ioooo an acre for industrial purposes while its value when zoned for residential use
was about $2,5oo. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384-85 (1926).
7 V19 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925).
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of value from practically all zoning cases. In all but the most extreme cases
where restrictions have demonstrably made property useless, the decision
as to the relative "losses" all property owners must assume for the good of
the community should rest with the legislative body responsible for the enactment of the ordinance.
Finally, less emphasis should be placed upon the fact that the property
which is the object of the controversy is near non-conforming uses or is on
the edge of a particular use district. A property owner may feel aggrieved if his property is restricted to residential use while in the samelor
in an adjacent block there is a beauty parlor, a corner grocery or a gas
station. Similarly, his protest may have a reasonable color should his undeveloped property be a block away from a commercial district. But the
record of cases indicates that usually it is the hard cases which reach the
courts and it is in these cases where expert judgment and local experience
are essential that the Court should honor the decision of the legislative
bodies.
It thus seems necessary that less emphasis be placed upon "value" and
upon existing non-conforming uses or district lines and that increasingly
candid attention should be given to the actual administration of the ordinance in the case before the Court. If the Court is skeptical of zoning because it has been subject to the pressures of politics and property owners
or real estate associations, then it is time to criticize zoning on that basis
rather than to stress factors which will inevitably exist even under the
most ideally administered zoning ordinance. Evidence of an intelligently
and carefully drawn zoning ordinance, the impartial and active administration of the ordinance, and proof of the relation of the particular part
of the ordinance in question to community needs, not only today but twenty-five years from today, should be the primary considerations in determining whether an ordinance is a reasonable exercise of the police power.
In view of the spotty record of zoning administration the Court cannot
be expected to initiate such a change in emphasis. A new approach mtst
be taken by the communities. This means that attorneys defending the
ordinance must be prepared to demonstrate that the complainant has
been given a fair hearing by the administrative and legislative bodies. It
should be a part of each defense to demonstrate that the ordinance has
not become a pork-barrel subject to frequent amendment or variation for
favorably situated property owners. So fortified, the defenders of the ordinance should be prepared to break down the reliance of aggrieved property owners upon the "value" test, and should move the contest into an
arena where they may demonstrate the merit of zoning-as it is being
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practiced in their community-as a means of protecting land values
throughout the city. Finally, the municipality must be prepared to interpret "the protection of land values" in terms of proper density of population, the prevention of blighted areas, the elimination of traffic congestion
and the encouragement of both residential and business growth. °
The legal status of zoning in Illinois will remain an uncertain and troublesome thing until the administrators are able to give city attorneys
a good record and those attorneys are willing to use that record as a
means of demonstrating the important function of zoning in urban land
development to the Court. It may be expected that when such a record is
presented to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the good faith of the community will be rewarded by a sympathetic clarification of the legal rules
by which zoning is to be measured.
so There is a growing awareness that too frequently planning commissions in viewing zoning
exclusively as a method of protecting residential values have actually retarded proper residential development. Thus until recently most ordinances permitted residential buildings in
areas zoned for commercial or industrial use, a practice which permitted indiscriminate residential growth and consequent deterioration of many residential buildings. In this respect, at
least, the Chicago ordinance is illustrative of the more recent approach. Chicago Mun. Code
(Hodes, 1939) § I9A--9.

